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WHEN SCALIA WASN’T SUCH AN ORIGINALIST 
Michael Lewyn* 
Justice Scalia described himself as an originalist1- that is, a 
judge who relies heavily on the “original meaning”2 of Constitutional 
provisions.  According to Justice Scalia, the originalist judge should 
ascertain the “meaning of the words of the Constitution to the society 
that adopted it.”3  Yet in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 4 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion upheld a Takings Clause claim 
while rejecting originalist arguments made in Justice Blackmun’s dis-
sent.5  Can Justice Scalia’s refusal to apply his own method be de-
fended, or was he ignoring the Constitution’s original understanding 
in order to achieve a morally correct result?  This article suggests that 
pre-Lucas Supreme Court precedent and the ambiguity of the Fifth 
Amendment’s original meaning might justify the Scalia opinion. 
I. BACKGROUND: LUCAS AND JUSTICE SCALIA’S NON-
ORIGINALIST MAJORITY OPINION 
In 1986, David Lucas purchased two residential lots on a 
South Carolina island, roughly 300 feet from the beach.6  But in 
1988, the state of South Carolina passed a statute limiting improve-
 
* Associate Professor, Touro Law Center.  B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D., University of 
Pennsylvania, L.L.M., University of Toronto. 
1 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-65 
(1989). 
2 Id. at 862 (claiming that alternative modes of constitutional interpretation fail to ade-
quately resolve question of “what, precisely, is to replace original meaning”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
3 Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 253 (2009) 
(citation omitted). 
4 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
5 Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  I note in passing that Justice Stevens also dis-
sented, on grounds not relevant to the primary subject paper.  Id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
6 Id. at 1008. 
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ments on beachfront land.7  Lucas filed suit, asserting that the new 
law constituted a taking of his property without just compensation, in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.8  A South Carolina trial court 
agreed, holding that the law “constituted a permanent ban on con-
struction insofar as Lucas’ lots were concerned . . . and render[ed] 
them valueless.”9  The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
because the legislation was designed to prevent serious public harm, 
no compensation was necessary even if South Carolina law made Lu-
cas’s land valueless.10 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that government 
regulation was a compensable taking when the “regulation denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land.”11  Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion noted that in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon,12 the Court held that the Takings Clause was not lim-
ited to government appropriation of property, but instead required 
compensation “if regulation goes too far.”13  The majority also quoted 
later case law stating that a compensable taking occurs when regula-
tion “denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”14  The 
majority added that this rule made sense as a matter of policy, be-
cause such a deprivation is “from the landowner’s point of view, the 
equivalent of a physical appropriation.”15 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote, inter alia,16 that “the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause originally did not extend to regulations 
of property, whatever the effect.”17  In support of this view, he relied 
heavily on 19th-century state court precedent holding that the Consti-
 
7 Id. at 1008-09 (citation omitted). 
8 U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
9 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. 
10 Id. at 1009-10 (describing decision) (citations omitted). 
11 Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).  The Court added that even a state law imposing such a 
complete deprivation of value would not constitute a compensable taking if “background 
principles of nuisance and property law,” justified the law--for example, if Lucas’s develop-
ment constituted a public nuisance.  Id. at 1031. 
12 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
13 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415). 
14 Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
15 Id. at 1017 (citation omitted). 
16 Justice Blackmun raised a variety of other arguments.  He asserted that the state law 
was not a taking because it was necessary to prevent public harm arising from beach erosion,  
the case was not ripe for review, and Lucas’s property in fact had economic value.   Id. at 
1036, 1039-43, 1047-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens dissented on other 
grounds.  Id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 1057. 
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tution only protected the right to possess land rather than property 
values.18  Similarly, 18th-century common law limited landowners’ 
rights to develop land; for example, an 18th-century landowner could 
“build nothing on his land that would alter the natural flow of wa-
ter.”19 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not respond to Justice 
Blackmun’s historical analysis with its own persuasive historical 
analysis.  Instead, Justice Scalia relied on the precedent discussed 
above, and on “the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause 
that has become part of our constitutional culture.”20  Where this 
“historical compact” came from is anything but clear: in a footnote, 
Scalia admitted that the Court’s rule was not “supported by early 
American experience.”21 
In response to Justice Blackmun’s dissent, Justice Scalia 
again relied on precedent, pointing out that “even [Justice Blackmun] 
does not suggest (explicitly, at least) that we renounce the Court’s 
contrary conclusion in Mahon.  Since the text of the [Takings] Clause 
can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations . 
. . we decline to do so as well.”22  So at first glance, Justice Scalia ap-
pears to have chosen precedent over the Constitution’s original mean-
ing. 
II. DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE 
So why would Justice Scalia ignore originalist methodology 
in the Takings Clause context?  One reason is Scalia’s willingness to 
adhere to nonoriginalist precedent.  Scalia has written that original-
ism, like any other legal theory, “must accommodate the doctrine of 
stare decisis; it cannot make the world anew.”23  Were this not the 
case, originalism would be “so disruptive of the established order of 
things that it will be useful only as an academic exercise and not as a 
 
18 Id. at 1057-58. 
19 Id. at 1059 (citation omitted).  Justice Blackmun also wrote that “James Madison, au-
thor of the Takings Clause, apparently intended it to apply only to direct, physical takings of 
property by the Federal Government.”  Id. at 1057 n.23.  He did not elaborate on this point, 
which is addressed in more detail. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
20 Id. at 1028. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 ANTONIN SCALIA: A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 139 
(1997). 
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workable prescription for judicial governance.”24  In earlier cases, the 
Supreme Court had written that a regulation is a taking if it “denies 
an owner economically viable use of his land.”25  Even if the Lucas 
Court’s categorical rule that such regulations are always takings went 
too far,26 the Court’s (then) 70-year-old rule that government regula-
tion can be a taking27 certainly supports some protection for property 
owners such as Lucas. 
More importantly, the original understanding of the Takings 
Clause does not require a contrary rule.  If the Takings Clause had a 
legislative history, and that history was flatly inconsistent with the 
Lucas rule, an originalist’s duty might be clear.  But in fact, this is 
not the case.  “There are apparently no records of discussion about 
the meaning of the clause in either [the ratifying] Congress, or, after 
its proposal, in the states.”28  Justice Blackmun relied on state court 
precedent,29 but such precedent has limited value, because the Tak-
ings Clause was originally designed to apply only to the federal gov-
ernment,30 and its drafters therefore expected federal power to be 
more limited than state power. 
It could be argued that post-enactment statements by James 
Madison, the author of the Takings Clause,31 are more decisive.  
Madison never directly explained the purpose of the Takings 
 
24 Id.  I note that Justice Scalia’s willingness to adhere to nonoriginalist precedent is quite 
controversial among originalist scholars.  Cf. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Prece-
dent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 
433-37 (2006) (describing several commentators’ views). 
25 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.  But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061, 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing such remarks as dicta). 
26 The Court could have held that such complete deprivations of value would be judged by 
a balancing test, rather than being categorically invalid.  Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 617 (2002) (where regulation reduces land’s value but does not completely deprive 
landowner of all economically beneficial use, court weighs economic harm to landowner’s 
property values and investment-backed expectations along with character of government ac-
tion at issue); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061, 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting application 
of balancing test to case at hand). 
27 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
28 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995). 
29 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
30 See Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical 
Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U.L. REV. 181, 227, 240 (1999) (noting that “the 
Takings Clause originally did not apply to the states” and suggesting that Framers of Consti-
tution trusted states more than federal government); Treanor, supra note 28, at 809 (Takings 
Clause applied to states only after enactment of Fourteenth Amendment). 
31 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Clause.32  But in a 1792 essay attacking high tariffs and a federal debt 
repayment plan that favored some speculators,33 Madison wrote: 
If there be a government which . . . provides that none 
shall be taken directly even for public use without in-
demnification of the owner, and yet directly violates 
the property which individuals have in their opinions, 
their religion, their persons, and their faculties; nay 
more, which indirectly violates their property, in their 
actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their dai-
ly subsistence . . . such a government is not a pattern 
for the United States.34 
Madison’s essay contrasts “direct” takings (which were com-
pensable under the Takings Clause) with “indirect violations” of 
property rights (which he opposed but did not suggest were compen-
sable).  So it could be argued that Madison believed that “the Takings 
Clause did not prevent the national government from using its taxing 
and regulatory powers to affect the distribution of wealth”; otherwise, 
he would have argued that “indirect violations” were takings as 
well.35  But this omission shows only that Madison thought that some 
“indirect violations” were not takings, not that no “indirect violation” 
could ever be a taking.  Moreover, Madison did not really define “di-
rect” takings; thus, it is not clear where he would draw the line be-
tween “direct” and “indirect” violations.36 
III. CONCLUSION 
In sum, there is no smoking gun that establishes whether the 
Framers expected the Takings Clause to limit non-confiscatory regu-
lations of property.  Given the uncertainty of the historical record, an 
originalist judge such as Justice Scalia could quite reasonably rely on 
other factors, such as precedent. 
 
 
32 See Treanor, supra note 28, at 847 (Madison “nowhere directly addressed” question of 
why “a takings clause was needed.”). 
33 Id. at 837-38 (describing background of essay). 
34 Id. at 838 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
   35   Id. at 840. 
36 See Gold, supra note 30, at 202-04 (discussing these issues in more detail). 
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